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I. INTRODUCTION
Good morning. Thank you for that wonderful introduction. I would like to
thank the editors of the Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy for inviting
me here today to speak at this timely symposium about work and the way in
which new technologies are affecting work. I think that this symposium has
situated itself in a broader conversation about the ways in which new
technologies are shaping and reorienting social and legal processes and
structures.1 It is my pleasure to discuss this phenomenon as it relates to race,
algorithms, and the practice of criminal law.
Algorithms are transforming the daily practice of criminal law. These
algorithms use statistical methods and big data to predict outcomes at different
levels of the criminal justice system. Police are using algorithms to predict
which individuals are at high risk of committing or being the victim of
violence.2 Pre-trial algorithms, which are designed to predict the statistical risk
of a defendant’s risk of flight or pre-trial crime, are being relied upon by bail
judges to inform their decision to release or to detain a defendant before trial.3
Sentencing algorithms, that purport to predict an offender’s risk of recidivism,
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. My thanks to the student
editors of the Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy for their thoughtful editing. This Article is
based on my keynote address, “When They Hear Us: Race, Algorithms and The Practice of
Criminal Law,” at the 2020 Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy Symposium on Friday,
February 28, 2020 and reflects the current state of developments as of that date. The author’s
position on communal inclusion in algorithmic governance has evolved since this speech was
given. For a fuller account, see Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms, 53
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author).
1
See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING
INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018).
2
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Black Data Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 503, 505–
06 (2018).
3
Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 508–10 (2018) [hereinafter
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants].
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are being used by sentencing judges to determine an offender’s sentence or
eligibility for a non-prison sentence.4 Parole boards are also using algorithms
to determine whether to parole inmates.5
These algorithms now have a significant impact on the daily lives of all,
but particularly on the lives of those ascribed racially marginalized identities,
who live in low-income, over-policed, and over-criminalized communities.6
These algorithmic predictions produce grave familial, communal, and
individual consequences for members of these marginalized communities.7
Yet, many jurisdictions have mandated the use of algorithms at one or at all
levels of their criminal justice system.8 Their use is part of a broader sociopolitical movement to reform a broken criminal justice system that incarcerates
too many people, disproportionately racially marginalized, who could
otherwise be released without posing a threat to community safety or the
administration of the criminal justice system.9
In an effort to address the cost, excess, and socioeconomic and racial
disparity in the criminal justice system, political actors have turned to
algorithms as a solution to this growing crisis. Those advocating for these
algorithms claim that the technology provides an evidence-based assessment of
an individual’s statistical risk.10 The idea is that increased reliance on
algorithms will improve the criminal justice system by conditioning an
individual’s apprehension or detention on their statistical risk rather than on the
subjective whim of a criminal justice actor.
4

Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 59–61 (2018); Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing
Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 61–63 (2017) [hereinafter Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism
Risk].
5
Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 537, 564–67 (2015) (documenting the use of risk assessment for parole hearings).
6
EUBANKS, supra note 1, at 12 (“Though these new systems have the most destructive and
deadly effects in low-income communities of color, they impact poor and working-class people
across the color line.”).
7
See generally Ngozi Okidegbe, The Democratizing Potential of Algorithms, 53 CONN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 18) (on file with author) (“Emerging studies suggest that the
formal equality approach of these algorithms harm racially marginalized defendants by subjecting
them to risk factors not designed to accurately forecast their risk of flight or crime. By not taking
into account the demographic differences in future offending, these algorithms produce inflated
risk scores that promote the unfair overincarceration of racially marginalized defendants without
any community safety justification.”).
8
Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, supra note 4, at 61 (“Predictive technologies increasingly
appear at every stage of the criminal justice process.”).
9

Shaila Dewan & Carl Hulse, Republicans and Democrats Cannot Agree on Absolutely
Anything. Except This., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/pr
ison-reform-bill-republicans-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/5G25-5ML6]; see generally
Samuel R. Wiseman, Bail and Mass Incarceration, 53 GA. L. REV. 235 (2018).
10
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 3, at 492–93 (“The core reform goal is to untether
pretrial detention from wealth and tie it directly to risk. To accomplish that objective, a growing
number of jurisdictions are adopting actuarial risk-assessment tools to sort high-risk from lowrisk defendants.”).
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Today, we are in the midst of a fraught debate in criminal justice reform
circles about the merits of using algorithms. Proponents claim that these
algorithms offer an objective path towards substantially lowering high rates of
incarceration and racial and socioeconomic disparities without endangering
community safety.11 On the other hand, racial justice scholars argue that these
algorithms threaten to entrench racial inequity within the system because they
utilize risk factors that correlate with historic racial inequities, and in so doing,
reproduce the same racial status quo, but under the guise of scientific
objectivity. 12
In this talk, I am going to discuss the challenge that the continued
proliferation of algorithms poses to the pursuit of racial justice in the criminal
justice system. I start from the viewpoint that racial justice scholars are correct
about currently employed algorithms. However, algorithms themselves are not
necessarily doomed to propagating the current system. Their effects are a
product of their design.
This feature about algorithms is important to think about in our current
political climate given that algorithms will continue to proliferate, and more
radical measures, such as abolition, appear politically infeasible.13 In this
context, I advocate that as long as we have algorithms, we should consider
whether they could be redesigned and repurposed to counteract racial inequity
in the criminal law process. One way that algorithms might counteract inequity
is if they were designed by most impacted racially marginalized communities.
Then, these algorithms might counterintuitively benefit these communities by
endowing them with a democratic mechanism to contest the harms that the
criminal justice system’s operation enacts on them.
With that in mind, I am going to first discuss the problems with currently
employed algorithms from a racial justice perspective. I will then detail the
11

See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 470–72 (2016)
(advocating for the development of bail guidelines based in actuarial risk assessment since this
could reduce racial disparities). Id. (“Because the models make testable predications, the
outcomes of which can be tracked, it is possible to detect and correct for disparate impacts.”).
12
See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27
FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015) (warning that “risk today has collapsed into prior criminal
history, and prior criminal history has become a proxy for race. The combination of these two
trends means that using risk-assessment tools is going to significantly exacerbate the
unacceptable racial disparities in our criminal justice system”).
13
An example of the political infeasibility of abolition can be gleaned from the experience in
New York State with bail reform. In early April 2020, New York decided to scale back its 2019
bail reform law that had eliminated cash bail for many misdemeanor offenses and non-violent
felonies. See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, FY 2020 NEW YORK STATE
EXECUTIVE BUDGET: PUBLIC PROTECTION AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT ARTICLE VII
LEGISLATION 182 (2019), https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/artvii/ppgg-artvii
.pdf [https://perma.cc/24W4-SS4B]; Taryn A. Merkl, New York’s Latest Bail Law Changes
Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/new-yorks-latest-bail-law-changes-explained [https://perma.cc/YZY2-CE
RH].
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benefits that these algorithms could have on most impacted communities if
designed by them. I will then conclude by sketching out an institutional
framework for creating and implementing algorithms in line with achieving
this result.
II. RACIAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE
Broadly speaking, currently employed algorithms reproduce the racial
status quo for four reasons. The first reason concerns the risk factors of these
algorithms. They utilize colorblind risk factors to assess a defendant’s
statistical riskiness.14 The cost of this choice is that these algorithms tend to
subject defendants to risk factors that are not reliable predictors for their
demographic group.
For instance, one of the factors that pre-trial algorithms take into account
for assessing pre-trial crime is an individual’s arrest record.15 But empirical
studies have shown that arrests are often less accurate predictors of pre-trial
crime risk for Black defendants.16 To compound the issue, members of
historically marginalized communities are arrested at higher rates than their
white counterparts due to racial profiling.17 This means that arrest rates are not
reflective of criminal offending rates among different demographic groups.18
These dual issues mean that racially marginalized defendants are more likely to
be designated at high risk of crime based on factors that are unreliable
predictors of the risk that they in fact pose. This state of affairs only fuels the
over-incarceration of racially marginalized people rather than redresses it.
The second problem with these algorithms is that these algorithms ignore
the socio-political conditions that give rise to crime and flight and its
management with incarceration. An individual’s risk of crime is often the
product of systemic but often changeable factors.19 For instance, a robust
14

Currently employed algorithms tend not to use race or racial information as inputs. Okidegbe,
supra note 7, at 15.
15
See, e.g., STANFORD LAW SCH., RISK ASSESSMENT FACTSHEET: CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT PROFILING FOR ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS (COMPAS) PRETRIAL RELEASE RISK
SCALE - II (PRRS-II) (2019), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CO
MPAS-PRRS-II-Factsheet-Final-6.20.pdf.
16
See, e.g., Richard Berk, Accuracy and Fairness for Juvenile Justice Risk Assessments, 16 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 185–86 (2019).
17
Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176,
2183 (2013) (“The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans, live in receive
more law enforcement in the form of police stops and arrests.”).
18
For a deeper discussion regarding the disproportionate rate of Black arrests, see CIVIL RIGHTS
DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT 3 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/J7U
B-TPM2].
19
Jessica M. Eaglin, Technologically Distorted Conceptions of Punishment, 97 WASH. U. L. REV.
483, 507 (2019) [hereinafter Eaglin, Conceptions of Punishment] (“[Risk assessment tools] grew
from a larger initiative to address the sociohistorical conditions that produce crime through a one-
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social assistance program could reduce an individual’s risk of committing
crime. The risk that a defendant might fail to appear at a bail hearing or a trial
could be counteracted if that jurisdiction adopted a system of court
reminders.20 But by failing to account for these potential systematic reforms,
the algorithm inevitably treats conditions on the ground that correlate with
flight and crime as constant and unalterable. Moreover, when we rely on
algorithmic predictions in isolation, we allow ourselves as a society to ignore
the socio-political context of crime and to exculpate ourselves from our
responsibility in creating and maintaining the conditions that give rise to risk.21
They allow us to pretend that crime risk is solely the fault of an individual’s
behavior or characteristics, even though it is societally constructed. From a
racial justice perspective, algorithms that are blind to these realities operate
only to obscure and maintain carceral conditions that give rise to racial tropes
and to the over-incarceration crisis.
The third problem with currently employed algorithms is their disregard
for the harms that an individual’s apprehension or detention engender.
However, apprehension or detention risks an individual’s bodily, mental, and
economic integrity. Moreover, detention risks destabilizing the defendant’s
family unit’s social kinship networks and finances. And for the community that
the defendant is part of, detention harms community safety by destabilizing
that defendant and reducing their prospect of financial and social reintegration
following their detention.22 Despite the risks and harms associated with
apprehension and detention, currently employed algorithms ignore them. This
leads to the apprehension and detention of individuals whose removal from the
community produces harms that jeopardize the safety of their families and their
communities. For this reason, it is difficult to imagine how the greater use of
algorithms will decrease the negative externalities of incarceration and mass
surveillance on these communities.
The final problem is that the majority of the jurisdictions that have turned
to algorithms have chosen to employ privately owned and developed ones.23
sided approach focused on controlling the individual’s behavior rather than simultaneously
addressing social conditions in society.”).
20
See John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk Assessment and the Future
of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1765 (2018) (“Small changes in the administration of
bail can have a substantial impact on failure to appear rates in a jurisdiction. Many of these
reforms are relatively low-cost and low-tech, such as text message reminders about upcoming
court dates.”).
21
See generally Eaglin, Conceptions of Punishment, supra note 19.
22
Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1425–28 (2017);
see generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281–96 (2004).
23
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1286 (2020)
(contending that “state legislatures and court systems that adopt new risk assessment tools
frequently procure them from foundations or the private sector, raising questions about
transparency”).
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These algorithms lack transparency, accountability mechanisms, and do not
reflect the views of most impacted communities. The omission of communal
input is particularly concerning because those most impacted by these
algorithms’ utilization should be the ones to have a say about how these
algorithms operate. This contribution is unlikely to occur if algorithms remain
designed exclusively by the private sector.
III. A NEW APPROACH
For this reason, the algorithms currently in existence pose a critical threat
to eradicating racial inequities in the criminal law process and should be
eliminated. One counterargument that has been put forth by those outside of
racial justice circles is that these algorithms should remain in use because they
are better than the current system.24 In support of this view, they point out that
criminal justice actors themselves tend to make arbitrary, ill-informed, and
often racially biased decisions that have culminated in the current crisis of
racialized mass incarceration and mass surveillance.25 To this point, it is true
that racial inequities are endemic in the criminal justice system with or without
algorithms. However, these algorithms have the same racist pathologies that
criminal justice actors suffer from, but they appear objective. This enables
these algorithms to produce the same racial inequities as criminal justice actors
but under the guise of scientific neutrality. This state of affairs makes it harder
to contest the racism embedded in algorithmic systems, and perversely allows
algorithms to legitimate existing racial disparities.
Given this, resistance to currently employed algorithms should continue.
However, mere resistance will not, I fear, result in their dismantlement. This is
because algorithms are part of a socio-technical phenomenon in which political
actors are turning to inexpensive technological shortcuts to solve complex
societal problems. Algorithms are everywhere, from banking to healthcare,
from hiring to surveillance. The proliferation of algorithms is likely to
continue. In the face of continued algorithmic governance, what should be the
racial justice response?
Because the racial effects of currently employed algorithms are not
endemic to the technology and stem from a series of design choices, it is worth
considering whether we could redesign algorithms against the reproduction of
the current racial status quo. This potential is realizable if these algorithms
were designed, implemented, and overseen by those hailing from most
impacted communities. In other words, the solution is to change who controls
these algorithms by situating most impacted communities into algorithmic
governance.
24

Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Even Imperfect Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal Justice
System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/upshot/algorithmsbail-criminal-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/D8P8-2GBZ].
25
Id.
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I am going to focus specifically on three potential benefits of this
approach.
A. Democratization Potential
The first benefit concerns democratization. By democratization, I mean
that including racially marginalized communities in algorithmic governance
has the power to shift control over the criminal justice system downward
towards communities historically harmed and politically disempowered by the
system.
This downward shift in power may not necessarily change outcomes, but
it matters because the historical and current operation of the criminal justice
system has been in service to the interests of wealthier and whiter communities
to the exclusion of racially marginalized communities.26 As a result, the
system is designed to promote the over-policing and over-incarceration of
racially marginalized communities without recognition of the democratic costs
that over-incarceration enacts on these communities. Yet over-incarceration
hampers these communities’ collective ability to participate in democratic
structures by denying voting rights and financial security to a large proportion
of their community members.27 This functions to deny members of these
communities full political, economic, and social citizenship in this country.28
To compound this issue, these harms also strip these communities of the
resources required to effectively contest policing and incarceration practices
through traditional democratic processes.29
Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 252 (2019) (“[T]he ideology of criminal procedure facilitates the exclusion of marginalized
communities from everyday criminal adjudication.”); K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson,
The Institutional Design of Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2020)
(manuscript at 15) (“[I]n the realm of criminal law, there is a toxic interaction between systems of
mass incarceration, state austerity, privatization, and continued racial subordination and
exclusion.”); Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2021) (contending that shifting power to communities most impacted by
incarceration does not guarantee any particular outcome though such power-shifting is reparative
and consistent with anti-subordination principles).
27
Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An
Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 266 (2008) [Roberts, Constructing
a Criminal Justice System] (“[The] criminal justice supervision of a large proportion of black
people interferes with their participation in democracy by isolating them in prisons, denying them
the right to vote, and damaging broader social and political relationships necessary for collective
action.”).
28
Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1597, 1602 (2017) (“Moreover, the criminal justice system’s supervision of black
communities has a disempowering impact that extends far beyond electoral politics. Incarcerating
so many members of black communities robs them of material resources, social networks, and
legitimacy required for full political citizenship and for organizing local institutions to contest
repressive policies.”).
29
Id.
26
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However, direct inclusion in algorithmic governance offers a workaround
to this democratic exclusion. Because of the growing importance of these
algorithms in criminal procedure, inclusion in algorithmic governance could
mean incorporating these communities’ views into criminal law practice and
policy. It could thus provide these communities with a mechanism to contest
their historical exclusion in the creation and implementation of criminal law
practices and policies.30 Moreover, this inclusion may endow these community
members with a mechanism to fundamentally change how the system works in
their neighborhoods. This change could radically reorient the system to be in
line with communal goals and aims.
B. Accountability
The second benefit concerns accountability. Currently, most impacted
communities have a diminished capacity to influence or hold accountable
criminal justice actors and others responsible for the over-incarceration of their
community members. This is because of most impacted communities’ reduced
political power to influence elections or appointment processes.31 However,
their inclusion in algorithmic governance might promote accountability by
providing a means by which to render criminal justice actors and other officials
responsive to their interests and needs. This facilitation of accountability could
transform these communities from the objects of the criminal justice system
into its subjects and partial controllers.
C. Less Racially Disparate Factors
The final benefit of direct inclusion in algorithmic governance is the
possibility that these communities’ expertise could render algorithms less
racially disparate. Unlike the technocrats traditionally involved in algorithmic
design, most impacted communities possess experiential knowledge about how
the criminal system operates in their neighborhoods.32 If harnessed, this
expertise could assist in identifying risk factors within currently employed
algorithms that promote the over-policing and the over-incarceration of their
community members at the expense of their communities’ safety and cohesion.
These communities’ expertise could also be used to identify and prevent the
detention of defendants most likely to be harmed by the experience.
30

Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice through Contestation and Resistance, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1610 (2017) (“[T]he unequal distribution of political power means that the
resulting criminal laws and enforcement are rarely responsive to the interests of the poor
populations of color most likely to come into contact with the system as arrestees, defendants, or
victims.”).
31
Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System, supra note 28, at 1597 (contending that the
criminal justice system’s operation reduces the political power of black people to elect candidates
that would promote their interest).
32
For an in-depth discussion, see generally Ngozi Okidegbe, Discrediting Communal Knowledge
Within an Algorithm Epistemology (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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These three possibilities illustrate that algorithms, if designed as part of an
anti-racist project, could play a substantial role in disrupting and contesting
racial stratification in the criminal justice system. If my proposal is actualized,
these algorithms could become a viable tool for communities to secure
transformative change.
IV. CONCLUSION
I will conclude by discussing the institutional framework that could
usher in the creation of algorithms that could unlock these potential racial
justice benefits. The crux of my proposal is the creation of criminal justice
commissions composed of members from most impacted communities and
technocrats charged with creating the formula of any algorithm used in the
criminal justice system. Institutional design choices could facilitate the sharing
of power between community commissioners and technocrats. In terms of
composition, I propose selecting community commissioners from those with
direct experience with the criminal justice system, such as formerly
incarcerated individuals or victims of crimes. This proximate relationship
ensures that community commissioners possess the experiential expertise
about the system’s operation needed to blunt its racialized effects. Importantly,
these algorithms would have a harm reduction component that would
incorporate factors weighing against an individual’s apprehension or detention
and would take into account the individual, familial, and communal
consequences of so doing. One such harm reduction factor could be the fact
that the defendant is the primary caregiver of a minor child. The power over
the harm reduction component should rest in the hands of community
commissioners.
Beyond this, the actualization of the proposal should spark a deeper
conversation about the purpose of the criminal justice system. Though these
conversations are already underway in legislatures across the country, the
viewpoints of most impacted communities remain largely disregarded and
unacted upon. Yet, these criminal justice commissions could change that by
opening up criminal justice policy and the concept of community safety and of
risk to be inclusive of all constituents involved, those hailing from low income
racially marginalized communities.
It is important to note that this proposal does not guarantee the end of
over-incarceration. That could only be guaranteed by complete decarceration
or abolition of the criminal justice apparatus. However, until either those
options are achieved, the proliferation of algorithms demands creative thinking
around how best to avoid their racially disparate effects. An approach that only
critiques algorithms without considering what they could achieve in anti-racist
projects is becoming increasingly unsustainable, especially since these
algorithms are here to stay. Furthermore, an approach that does not allow
community members to change these algorithms serves only to perversely
prevent these communities from influencing the algorithms threatening their
safety. When viewed in the present-day context, the approach fails to offer a

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3818995

338

KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

Vol. XXIX:3

way forward if opposition to algorithms is unsuccessful. The hope of this talk
and my work is to start a conversation about the need for a multifaceted
approach to addressing the dangers that algorithms pose to racially
marginalized communities.
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